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Abstract 
 
The complex challenges posed by stabilization and reconstruction undertakings today 
require an unprecedented degree of coordination among both civilian and military 
tools of conflict response. Harnessing civilian resources has grown increasingly important 
to filling the gap between military intervention and sustainable peace. Policymakers 
within the European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) continue to adapt their 
respective crisis management concepts and approaches to meet these challenges 
more successfully. In light of the rising attention paid to this policy area, EU-U.S. 
cooperation in Civilian Crisis Management (CCM) has been deemed by one official 
interviewed as “an idea whose time has come”.1 A joint Work Plan recently signed by EU 
and U.S. officials and the U.S. contribution to the civilian mission of the European Security 
and Defense Policy (ESDP) in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), the first case of U.S. participation in 
an ESDP mission, embarks on a new chapter in bilateral security relations. The 
partnership has been facilitated by the growing EU expertise in the field and the 
creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in 
the U.S. Department of State. Pledging to work together in areas from dialogue to 
personnel training to country analysis, both actors seek to improve their concepts and 
approaches and aim to partner in efforts on the ground. While cooperation has come 
underway in recent months, attempts in formalizing relations endured several years of 
efforts by policymakers.  
This paper asks to what extent the policy conceptions and approaches of the EU 
and U.S. in the area of non-military conflict response converge, why EU-U.S. cooperation 
in CCM has come so cautiously and how it is likely to develop in the future. I argue that 
the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ and the U.S.’s ‘whole of government’ approach 
are near equals in the integrated responses they aim to deliver. However, the 
development of EU-U.S. cooperation in this policy area has been confronted by the 
limitations of the larger transatlantic security relationship vis-à-vis the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). A warming of attitudes toward a bilateral security 
relationship will likely continue, but looking to the U.S. contribution to EULEX Kosovo as an 
indicator, I would argue that the relationship will face institutional complications and 
continue to struggle to strike a balance alongside the role of NATO in the task of 
confronting today’s complex crises.  
                                                 
1 Interview with U.S. official, Political-Military Affairs Unit, U.S. Mission to the EU, Brussels, 7 April 2008. 
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1. Introduction: “An Idea whose Time Has Come” 
 
The lessons of Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans and nearly all other conflicts played out in 
the post-Cold War era call in chorus for improved capacities in non-military means of 
crisis management. The full range of tasks required to fill the gap between military 
intervention and those civilian resources needed to stabilize and reconstruct an ailing 
society demand an unprecedented degree of coordination across government 
agencies and a fundamental shift in traditional policy approaches to the world’s trouble 
spots. Following the September 11th terrorist attacks and those in Madrid and London, 
harnessing such crisis management capabilities has become a strategic imperative in 
Brussels and Washington. As indicated by both the EU and U.S. in their respective 
security strategies, the threat posed by instability emanating from failing states tops the 
list among security concerns.2 Amid increasingly transnational challenges and the long-
term, tedious nature of stability and reconstruction undertakings, there is “no alternative 
to collective action”.3  
It follows then, that one official would describe EU-U.S. cooperation in civilian crisis 
management (CCM)4 in an emphatic tone, declaring it as “an idea whose time has 
come”.5 The EU and U.S. have ventured extensively into other realms of collaboration, 
from coordinating diplomatic efforts on international issues to enhancing partnership in 
homeland security. However, bilateral6 cooperation in the field of CCM has not easily 
fallen in line behind those other points finding their way into the pages of annual EU-U.S. 
summit statements and onward into meaningful action. The merits of working together 
in an area pressing for attention and offering a tool with which to more effectively 
                                                 
2 Council of the European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World – The European Security 
Strategy”, Brussels, 12 December 2003, pp.1-14.; President of the United States of America, “The 
National Security Strategy of the United States”, Washington, D.C., March 2006, pp. 1-54, 
retrieved 2 March 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/ 2006/nss2006.pdf. 
3 J. Dobbins, “New Directions for Transatlantic Security Cooperation”, Survival, vol. 47, no. 4, 
Winter 2005-2006, p. 40. 
4 A number of labels are used to describe the non-military means of conflict response. Broadly 
speaking, the EU references this concept as civilian crisis management (CCM) while U.S. officials, 
government agencies and scholars employ the term stabilization and reconstruction (S&R). The 
official language in the EU-U.S. joint work plan employs the phrase “civilian aspects of crisis 
management and conflict prevention” as the area in which cooperation will occur. Because this 
terminology is most similar to that used by the EU and for the sake of consistency, CCM will be 
the term used throughout this paper. Council of the European Union, “Work Plan EU-U.S. 
Technical Dialogue and Increased Cooperation in Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention, 
(16055/07)”, Brussels, 3 December 2007 (hereafter cited as “Work Plan”).  
5 Interview with U.S. official, USEU, op.cit.  
6 While use of the term ‘bilateral’ in describing the EU-U.S. relationship can be considered 
incorrect on the grounds that the EU is itself a regional organization of many members, I will use 
this term throughout the paper as a means of distinguishing the primary focus of this paper – EU-
U.S. cooperation – from other forums of cooperation such as EU-NATO. 
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address complex crises appear clear and beneficial. Yet the last several years of 
attempts in formalizing cooperation have found policymakers treading beyond the 
long-held confines of transatlantic security relations within NATO and met with obstacles 
and reservations on both sides of the Atlantic.  
Only recently have officials witnessed the tangible results of several years of 
efforts. A joint Work Plan7 was signed by EU and U.S. officials in late 2007, offering a 
foundation and framework for EU-U.S. dialogue and combined action in the field of 
CCM. A breakthrough on many levels, the Work Plan is the first case of security 
cooperation between the U.S. and the EU outside the scope of NATO, opening a new 
door in transatlantic relations. A second initiative also bodes well for future collaboration 
in this area. The U.S. contribution of personnel to the EU mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) 
takes an unprecedented step in cooperation, the first-ever U.S. participation in an ESDP 
mission. Though running on a separate storyline as the Work Plan, the developments 
together attest to the current attention paid by each actor to the growing demand for 
civilian aspects of conflict response and the need for collective action. These efforts, 
although in merely the first stages of conception and implementation, comprise a 
unique opportunity in a policy area which both the EU and U.S. are continuing to define 
at home. 
  Given the inaugural nature of the Work Plan and U.S. participation in EULEX 
Kosovo, these recent initiatives merit a closer look. Efforts in civilian crisis management 
and stabilization and reconstruction (S&R), the terms employed by the EU and U.S. 
respectively for this policy area, are relatively new. In an analysis of cooperation 
between two actors often mused as being as distant as ‘Mars and Venus’ in their 
foreign policy approaches, finding common ground can be fundamental to success. 
Acknowledging the novelty of this policy area, do the EU and the U.S. share similar 
conceptions and approaches in the field of non-military conflict response? 
  Just as common conceptions of a policy area are essential for successful 
common action, the will for cooperation plays an equally fundamental role. With 
questionable progress in Afghanistan and other crises tempting to increase the fragility 
of already unstable regions, the prospect of cooperation in developing urgently 
needed civilian capabilities should have elated policy-makers. Why has EU-U.S. 
cooperation in CCM come so cautiously and how is it likely to develop in the future?  
  I argue that the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ and the U.S.’s ‘whole of 
government’ approach are near equals in the integrated responses they aim to deliver. 
However, the development of EU-U.S. cooperation in this policy area has been 
confronted by the limitations of the larger transatlantic security relationship vis-à-vis 
                                                 
7 “Work Plan”, op.cit.  
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NATO. A warming of attitudes toward a bilateral security relationship will likely continue, 
but I would argue, looking to the U.S. contribution to EULEX Kosovo as an indicator, that 
the relationship will face institutional complications and continue to struggle to strike a 
balance alongside the role of NATO in the task of confronting today’s complex crises. 
  This paper will examine these questions by first more clearly defining the often 
blurry policy area surrounding non-military aspects of crisis management. It will then go 
on to discuss EU conceptions and development of CCM and U.S. conceptions and 
development of S&R policies, providing a comparison of both actors’ approaches. 
Finally, the paper will offer an overview of the Work Plan and important events and shifts 
in attitudes which allowed for its finalization. With the U.S. contribution to EULEX Kosovo 
as a test case, the paper will analyze potential obstacles to future cooperation. 
 
2. Defining the Policy Area 
 
2.1 What Needs? 
 
What needs are the EU and the U.S. seeking to meet? Prompted by the shortcomings 
evident in post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq, conversation has buzzed about 
composing a suitable formula of how best to approach conflict management and state 
reconstruction. The inherent difficulties lay in the reality that this is a policy area where 
“the agendas of security and development studies have increasingly converged.”8 
Stabilizing and rebuilding a society plagued by both violence among domestic groups 
and the ineptitude of state institutions to maintain order or retain citizens’ confidence 
designates a role to nearly every part of the patron government. Agriculturalists, 
economists, police and others must join ranks to forge a holistic approach to the mission 
at hand. The merits of integrating security and development policies more effectively 
are largely acknowledged by international actors. However, built-in bureaucratic and 
operational obstacles to an ad hoc formation of various government agencies inhibit 
successful coordination and implementation of reconstruction efforts. Configuring 
appropriate strategies and logistics still perplex officials in capitals and personnel on the 
ground. The EU and U.S. have encountered, to varying degrees, such hurdles in 
developing their approaches and capacities in this field. 
Recognizing these needs and challenges, policymakers and academics have 
sought to carve out the fundamental, core conditions necessary for further 
reconstruction efforts to take hold.  
                                                 
8 R. Dannreuther, International Security: The Contemporary Challenges, Cambridge, Polity, 2007, 
p. 158.  
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2.2 Preconditions for Development 
 
In the discourse on conflict management and reconstruction, a central and essential 
element remains predominant in addressing the needs of weak, conflict-stricken 
nations. The establishment of “state structures and institutions that can underpin 
successful, lasting market economy and democratic systems” and prevent the 
reoccurrence of violence lay at the foundation of sustainable reconstruction.9 Rule of 
law entails what Mary Kaldor terms “the reconstruction of legitimacy”, the principle that, 
through successfully operating within a set of laws, state institutions gain the respect and 
consent of citizens.10 A precondition for further development, rule of law involves the 
deployment of a fusion of policemen and trainers, judges, prison officers and others to 
restore order and security to an instable environment, allowing the society and its 
citizens to function and begin rehabilitation.11 The central role of international civilian 
police (CIVPOL) in UN peacekeeping missions demonstrates the long-recognized merits 
of rule of law efforts.  
However, policing activities in conflict zones varying in degrees of violence can 
simultaneously lend to the blurring of lines between military and police functions. 
Peacekeeping literature grapples with the challenge of how to fill the “enforcement 
gap” and strike an effective balance between military intervention and unarmed 
civilian police activities in addressing transitional societies.12 Indeed, disagreements 
arose throughout the Balkan wars on the degree of enforcement power to divest to 
peacekeeping missions and how to coordinate military and civilian police activities.13 
These themes persist as ethical and institutional dilemmas facing EU and U.S. officials 
tackling the formulation of policy designed to meet rule of law needs in zones of 
conflict. As a central instrument in securing stability and initiating reconstruction, much 
of the discussion of EU-U.S. cooperation in CCM will revolve around policies and 
conceptions pertaining to rule of law and related tasks. 
 
                                                 
9 “Towards More Effective Peace Building: a Conversation with Ronald Paris”, Interview, 
Development in Practice, vol. 15, no. 6, 2005, p. 769. 
10 M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Polity Press, 2006, p. 121. 
11 Some actors consider rule of law to include policing and others discuss them separately. 
Regardless, they are mutually reinforcing aspects of stability operations. M. Dziedzic, 
“Introduction”, in Robert Oakley et al. (eds.), Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations 
and Public Security, Washington, D.C., National Defense University, 1998, p.  9.  
12 Ibid.  
13 Powers range from training to mentoring to advisory to executive. (These terms vary throughout 
peacekeeping literature.) J. Dobbins et. al., America’s Role in Nation-Building from Germany to 
Iraq, Rand, Santa Monica, CA, 2003, p. 96. 
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2.3 What Is in a Name? 
 
Given the inherent complexities of a policy area where the lines between security and 
development increasingly merge, it is appropriate in the context of a discussion on EU-
U.S. cooperation in this field to beg the question whether either actor has solidified their 
understanding of the non-military means of conflict management. Does the EU have a 
harmonized conception of CCM throughout its institutions? Have various U.S. agencies 
within the federal government embraced the policies of stabilization and reconstruction 
(S&R)? One may argue that even the international community, a veteran of intervention 
in the world’s trouble spots, is far from having a unified approach in such a blurred 
policy area. “For the international community in general, the concept of failed states 
represents a coming together of distinct communities – the humanitarian, human rights, 
development and security – but it means very different things to each of these 
communities, undermining the dialogue on approaches and response.”14 The 
implications of such confusion and inconsistency on the ability of actors, national or 
multinational, to cooperate can inhibit effective responses in addressing the needs of 
weak states. A discussion of EU-U.S. cooperation in CCM, then, must be preceded by an 
evaluation of both actors’ work in this area. How has the concept developed and what 
do the EU and U.S. understand CCM and S&R, respectively, to entail? 
 
3. EU and U.S. Conceptions and Approaches 
 
3.1 EU Developments and Approaches: Civilian Crisis Management 
 
The Union’s endeavors in the field of civilian crisis management are, as one author 
suggests, “a central feature of the EU’s identity and profile as an international actor”.15 
The EU has gained recognition through its CCM undertakings in recent years, prompting 
many to assert that the Union has developed an expertise in the field.16 The EU has been 
deliberate in recognizing that the tools necessary to meet the needs of conflict 
                                                 
14 Crisis Management Initiative, “Transatlantic Cooperation in Civilian Crisis Management: Best 
Practices in Building Capabilities and Planning for Action”, Workshop background notes, Brussels, 
8 November 2007. 
15 K. Möttölä, “The European Union and Crisis Management”, in H. Gärtner & I. Cuthbertson 
(eds.), European Security and Transatlantic Relations after 9/11 and the Iraq War, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2005, p.183. 
16 e.g. A. Nowak, “Introduction”, in A. Nowak (ed.), Civilian Crisis Management the EU Way, 
Chaillot Paper, no. 90, Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2006, p. 9. 
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management and reconstruction cover a vast spectrum. Giovanna Bono even argues 
that there is “a widespread perception of ‘uniqueness’ in the ‘European approach’”.17    
 
The ‘European Approach’ 
For an entity often viewed as what François Duchêne long ago branded a ‘civilian 
power’, the EU’s strides in the area of civilian crisis management should flow naturally 
from its identity as such.18 An essential element of ‘civilian power’, as it is commonly 
considered, is the deployment of non-military, especially economic, instruments in 
addressing issues of international security.19 Indeed, prior to the inception of the 
European Security and Defense Policy, the EU relied solely on the scarce ‘civilian’ tools 
in the competence of the European Commission in its early attempts to tackle the 
conflicts in the Balkans. From the origin of the ESDP under the Franco-British initiative in 
1998, attention has been devoted in equal measure to the development of both military 
and civilian capacities for conflict management.  
The Union’s ‘uniqueness’, however, does not stem simply from the Union’s 
commitment to CCM but more distinctively from its emphasis on a ‘comprehensive 
approach’20 which fuses military and civilian instruments. The importance which EU 
policymakers have placed on this ‘comprehensive approach’ is manifest in multiple EU 
documents and especially in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS): “In contrast to 
the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor 
can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments.”21 
One author suggests such a ‘mixture’ lay at the core of EU efforts: “The coordination of 
civil and military instruments in crisis management operations is being planned and 
prepared as an integral element of the operational culture underlying the ESDP.”22  
With the aim to maximize complementarity among the Union’s instruments, EU 
policymakers pursue a holistic policy, seeking coordination of crisis management tools 
across the institutional pillars. 
 
                                                 
17 G. Bono, “The Role of the EU in External Crisis Management”, International Peacekeeping, vol. 
11, no. 3, 2004, p. 395. 
18 F. Duchêne, “The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence”, in M. 
Kohnstamm & W. Hager (eds.), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems Before the 
European Community, London, MacMillan, 1973. 
19 M. Merlingen & R. Ostrauskaite, European Union Peacebuilding and Policing: Governance and 
the European Security and Defence Policy, New York, Routledge, 2006, p. 14. 
20 The term ‘comprehensive approach’ is also employed by NATO, but the term arguably has 
different implications for the Alliance, which does not have its own civilian crisis management 
capacities, but only those of national capacities.  
21 “The European Security Strategy”, op.cit. 
22 Möttölä, op.cit., p. 190. 
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Developing Conceptions 
The first definitions of CCM emerged alongside the concept’s debut into EU policy via 
ESDP. The items included in a mid-1999 inventory of the civilian tools available from 
each Member State provide insight into the initial conception of CCM. Resources 
spanned from civilian police, humanitarian assistance, administration and legal 
rehabilitation to search and rescue, electoral and human rights monitoring.23 The 
framing of CCM into four policy areas at the June 2000 Feira summit did not respond to 
a policymaker analysis of likely peacebuilding scenarios, but rather reflected the fields in 
which Member States had accumulated substantial resources.24 These priority areas 
include policing, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection. 
T h e  a r e a  o f  p o l i c i n g  u n d e r t o o k  a  l e a d i n g  r o l e  i n  C C M  i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  t h e  
frustrations Member States experienced in stabilizing Kosovo. The early goal of 5,000 
available police officers for ESDP missions was pledged quickly by Member States. With 
particular concern for a rapid reaction element to their efforts, officials assigned 1,000 
policemen to deployment within 30 days. Capabilities in policing were developed with 
the intention to be available across a range of powers, from advising to assisting and 
later to executive powers.    
Member States were encouraged to similarly refine their national arrangements 
for selecting resources in the area of rule of law, namely judicial and penal system 
experts, for contribution to Union efforts in the field. Intended to support and temporarily 
substitute for the local judiciary and legal authorities, a pool of 200 experts has been 
gathered for deployment within 30 days.  
Civil administration and civil protection have received less attention from EU 
policymakers but also aim to fill the gaps where indigenous authorities are weak. Tasks in 
civil administration range from election, taxation and social services to infrastructure 
backing such as providing electricity and rebuilding bridges.25 Civil protection was 
designed to aid victims of “natural, technical, and environmental disasters in situations 
marked by political violence”.26   
Keeping pace with the deepening complexities of conflict and the varying 
dynamics of each conflict situation, policymakers have recently focused more intensely 
on pursuing an ‘integrated’ approach to crisis management. The 2004 Action Plan for 
the Civilian Aspects of ESDP was heralded as a ‘breakthrough’ for CCM and is 
                                                 
23 J. Howorth, The Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2007, p. 55. 
24 Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, op.cit., p. 45. 
25 S. Keukeleire & J. MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, New York, Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2008, p. 181. 
26 Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, op.cit., pp. 47-49. 
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pinpointed as a moment of doctrinal shift in EU peacebuilding.27 The Civilian Headline 
Goal (CHG) 2008 crafted in 2004 embodied this shift. As one author notes: 
It emphasizes the importance of moving beyond the existing compartmentalized 
approach to peacebuilding and to develop the capacity to deploy 
multifunctional or modular peacebuilding packages (…) Allied to this new, 
modular thinking, the Union has been moving from a supply-driven approach to 
capability development to a needs-driven approach based on strategic 
assessments of the demand and nature of future interventions.28   
 
The Union sought to draw upon, as needed, a wide-range of instruments which spread 
across the Council, Commission and Member States in a way which was proactive, not 
simply reactive. 
The 2004 reassessment of post-enlargement capabilities which accompanied the 
Action Plan saw two additional areas included among the EU’s priorities in CCM: 
mentoring capabilities and support for Commission missions in third countries and EU 
Special Representatives (EUSR). In addition the Union pursued work in the field of both 
security sector reform (SSR), involving short-term capacity-building measures for armed 
services in conflict situations, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
(DDR).29 Perhaps the most successful incarnation of the Union’s modular, peacebuilding 
packages thinking is the development of both rapidly deployable integrated police 
units (IPU), capable of performing executive policing tasks, and civilian response teams 
(CRT), composed of 100 experts from an array of fields able to provide an initial 
presence in a conflict situation. 
 
In Practice 
Beyond action plans and headline goals, the Union has proved relatively capable of 
employing its range of civilian instruments. A majority of ESDP operations to date have 
drawn upon the civilian functions of ESDP. Multiple police missions beginning with the EU 
Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and ranging to Afghanistan and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) demonstrate the central role of policing 
within CCM. Other missions have extended activities to monitoring in Aceh, Indonesia 
and border assistance in Gaza. In Georgia the Union deployed its first rule of law mission, 
and in Iraq the Union employed a somewhat modular approach, labeling its 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 M. Freire, “ESDP: History, Structures and Capabilities”, in M. Merlingen & R. Ostrauskaite (eds.), 
European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective, New York, Routledge, 
2008, p. 16. 
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undertakings there as an ‘integrated’ rule of law mission.30 In Iraq and Indonesia the EU 
sent its first ‘packages’ of experts as part of assessment missions to lay the groundwork 
for future operations.31 In sum, the variety and geographical reach of these missions, in 
the least, confirms some degree of the Union’s civilian operational capacity.  However, 
room for improvement remains. It is important to note that some of the Union’s 
operations, for example its rule of law mission in Georgia, contain less than 20 personnel. 
In addition, as EU Foreign Ministers noted in their November 2008 Council Conclusions on 
civilian capabilities, improvements are needed in several areas, including rapid 
reaction, the development of national strategies which facilitate EU civilian deploy-
ments and coherence between ESDP missions and other EU instruments.32  
 
3.2 U.S. Developments and Approaches: Stabilization & Reconstruction 
 
An evaluation of U.S. efforts in meeting the call for non-military means of conflict 
management and reconstruction presents a wholly different narrative than that of the 
EU. Whereas EU CCM together with its policies, institutions and operations was created 
in response to the needs manifest in destabilizing conflicts along its borders, the U.S., with 
its pre-existing government agencies and policy history had to adapt to meet the needs 
of modern security challenges in the post-Cold War era. As one author points out in 
contrasting EU security priorities to those of the U.S., “war fighting and global power 
projection are not the functions of ESDP, but stabilization and peace enforcement with 
the capability to operate beyond Europe are”.33 Dissecting the diverging strategic 
cultures of the EU and U.S. does not serve the purpose of this piece, but this 
fundamental underlying point should not be overlooked. With this difference in mind, 
U.S. efforts in its mission to adapt deserve ample attention in the context of the larger 
discussion of EU-U.S. cooperation in CCM.    
 
Responding to the Call 
For a nation often dismissed as unwaveringly committed to ‘hard power’, recent U.S. 
efforts in developing non-military crisis response capabilities are significant. A formidable 
constituency has gained momentum throughout the past several years advocating a 
                                                 
30 A. Nowak, “Civilian Crisis Management within ESDP” in Nowak, Civilian Crisis Management the 
EU Way, op.cit., p. 34. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Council of the European Union, General Affairs and External Relations Council, Council 
Conclusions on Civilian Capabilities, Brussels, 11 November 2008, http://www.consilium. 
europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/PESD_EN-civilian_capabilities.pdf . 
33 J. Vogler & C. Bretherton, The European Union as a Global Actor, New York, Routledge, 2006, p. 
209. 
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restructuring of American civilian resources for stabilization and reconstruction efforts. 
Prominent research organizations have joined ranks alongside former ambassadors, 
military leaders, bipartisan efforts in Congress and high-level campaigns in the Bush and 
now Obama Administrations. Such an impressive and overwhelming backing, spanning 
the executive and congressional branches and party lines has proved a notable feat in 
Washington.  
President Bush’s 2007 State of the Union address called for the creation of a 
Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC)34, providing substantial momentum and visibility for the 
administration’s initiative. Then Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice championed the 
cause as a central aspect of her ‘transformational diplomacy’ initiative. Pairing with 
Senator Richard Lugar, Rice issued a powerful Washington Post op-ed piece in 
December 2007 endorsing legislation to create and provide funding for a CRC to 
address the security threats of weak states: “Responding to these challenges is a job for 
civilians”, they declared.35 But perhaps the most outspoken advocate of radical 
improvement in the capacity of U.S. civilian instruments of statecraft is the U.S. Secretary 
of Defense, Robert Gates. In his prominent speech at Kansas State University in 
November 2007 Gates preached the need for civilian capabilities and new institutions 
for the 21st century. “We must focus our energies beyond the guns and steel of the 
military, beyond just our brave soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen. We must also focus 
our energies on the other elements of nationa l  p o w e r  t h a t  w i l l  b e  s o  c r u c i a l  i n  t h e  
coming years.”36 Secretary Gates’ speeches and policy line continue to urgently press 
this message as he continues to serve as Defense Secretary in the Obama 
Administration today.  
 
The Path to S/CRS 
America, however, has not just made its introduction to this policy realm. The U.S. 
participated heavily in the multitude of multinational peacebuilding operations 
conducted throughout the 1990s, including taking the lead on interventions in Somalia, 
Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo. U.S. contributions to international civilian police (CIVPOL) 
                                                 
34 “Such a corps would function much like our military reserve. It would ease the burden on the 
Armed Forces by allowing us to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when 
America needs them. It would give people across America who do not wear the uniform a 
chance to serve in defining the struggle of our time”, President George W. Bush , “State of the 
Union 2007”, The White House, 23 January 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2007/01/20070123-2.html. 
35 Richard Lugar & Condoleeza Rice, “A Civilian Partner for Our Troops: Why the U.S. Needs a 
Reconstruction Reserve”, The Washington Post, 17 December  2007. 
36 Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense, “Landon Lecture at Kansas State University”, U.S. 
Department of Defense, 26 November 2007, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/ 
speech.aspx?speechid+1199. 
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missions began in 1994 in Haiti and the U.S. has now become the largest contributor to 
CIVPOL missions. Independent U.S. initiatives in civilian police training and rule of law 
efforts in post-conflict countries are evident as early as the late 1980s with police training 
in Latin America. Thus, recognition of the role of policing and rule of law has long existed 
within the U.S. government but the organization of these responsibilities across 
departments points to the major struggle which the U.S. has encountered in this field. 
With capacities spread from the Justice Department to the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), American efforts in this arena have proved ad hoc “with little 
interagency planning and coordination and often the U.S. military in the lead”.37 In 
addition, personnel for such CIVPOL or police training activities were often sourced from 
pricey private security contractors such as DynCorps, and not within the government.  
International engagement quickly took center-stage in the Bush administration’s 
first term facing a dramatically altered security environment in the wake of the 
September 11th terrorist attacks. Amid the aftermath of a swift military victory in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the glaring insufficiencies of U.S. capabilities in reconstruction and 
stabilization shone bright. Administration officials, Congressmen and the think tank 
community grappled to offer remedies to the evident, systemic problem within the U.S. 
crisis management structure. While individual agencies sought to improve their part in 
stabilization and reconstruction efforts, “each department’s failures are magnified by 
the overall lack of coordination and strategy with the government as a whole”.38 An 
attempt to provide coordination and initiate greater changes in U.S. capacities 
manifested itself in the form of the Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and 
Stabilization created within the State Department in July 2004 by a Congressional 
mandate. As described by the first Coordinator for S/CRS, Ambassador Carlos Pascual: 
“The office was created with the mandate to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. 
government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, to help 
stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife.”39 Advocates of 
such reforms praised the creation of the new office, a long needed aid in healing the 
ad hoc nature of U.S. efforts past. 
 
                                                 
37 N. Serafino & M. Weiss, “Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background and 
Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities”, RL32862, Congressional Research Service, The 
Library of Congress, 18 September 2006, p. 3. 
38 F. Barton et al., “A Steep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States”, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 20 March 2008. 
39 Carlos Pascual, “Stabilization and Reconstruction: Building Peace in a Hostile Environment”, 
delivered to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., 16 June 2005. 
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U.S. Conception of Stabilization and Reconstruction 
As laid out in National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) which mandated 
S / C R S  i n  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 5 ,  t h e  B u s h  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  s o u g h t  t o  a p p l y  a  ‘ w h o l e  o f  
government’ approach, placing the Secretary of State at the helm of efforts to 
coordinate and integrate the resources of U.S. Departments and agencies to conduct 
S&R operations with or without the military.40 The Secretary is also tasked with 
harmonizing S&R efforts if a military operation is planned or ongoing.41 Department of 
Defense Directive 3000.05 commits the Defense Department to develop its functions for 
S&R, in complement to NSPD-44.42 The S/CRS office has already sought to embrace this 
‘whole of government’ concept by detailing staff from State, USAID, Defense, Treasury, 
Justice, Homeland Security, the CIA and others. As former Secretary Rice noted in a 
2006 speech at Georgetown University, “we envision this office assembling and 
deploying the kinds of civilians who are essential in post-conflict operations: police 
officers and judges and electricians, bankers and economists and legal experts and 
elections monitors”.43 In complement to this ‘whole of government’ approach, a 
community of Administration, Congressional and think tank supporters have coined the 
term ‘smart power’ which advocates the “integration and appropriate application of 
all the tools of statecraft”.44 A series of Congressional hearings on ‘smart power’ were 
initiated under then Senator Joe Biden’s chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, signaling a growing interest and concern for S&R efforts within the U.S.  
  The intended deployment capacity of S/CRS consists of three tiers of Civilian 
Response Corps (CRC) to be organized and operated from S/CRS for S&R purposes. An 
Active Component of optimally 250 rapid responders will be federal employees45 
employed solely to the purposes of S&R, including training and immediate deployment. 
                                                 
40 “National Security Presidential Directive 44: Frequently Asked Questions”, U.S. Department of 
State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, retrieved 10 June 2009, 
http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=49QT .  
41 The White House, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and 
Stabilization”, National Security Presidential Directive 44, 7 December 2005. 
42 U.S. Department of Defense, “Managing Support for Stability, Security, Transition and 
Reconstruction Operations”, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, 28 November 2005.  
43 Condoleeza Rice, “Transformational Diplomacy”, speech delivered at Georgetown University, 
Washington, D.C., 18 January 2006, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/ 
secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm. 
44 General A. Zinni, USMC & Admiral L. Smith, USN “Smart Power: Building a Better, Safer World,” 
Joint Testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 5 March 2008. 
45 The CRC has recently formalized into a partnership of eight departments and agencies 
including the Department of State, USAID, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of 
Health and Human Services, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice 
and the Department of the Treasury. “Introduction to the Civilian Response Corps”, US 
Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, retrieved 10 
June 2009, http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=4QRB.    
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This ‘cadre of specialists’ would assess the needs of the situation on the ground and 
provide logistical guidance.46 The Standby Component comprises full-time government 
employees who have certain expertise and skill-sets and have volunteered to undergo 
training and be considered for deployment within 30 days for six months. A database 
would track this pool; S/CRS has requested funding for 2,000 Standby members.47 The 
Reserve Component seeks to cover the broad range of expertise needed for successful 
S&R activities, expertise which may not always be available on staff. A pool of, ideally, 
2,000 non-U.S. government employees such as city planers, civil engineers or police 
trainers would train similarly to the National Guard.48 A list of 121 career skill categories 
have been identified as necessary for S&R activities, a majority of which fall in the areas 
of public security and rule of law.  
 
In Practice 
Though created in 2004, only in July of 2008 did S/CRS receive a substantial budget for 
its activities and only with the impetus of this budget was the Civilian Response Corps 
formally launched that same month. Funding has provided enormous momentum to the 
office’s work and has afforded the CRC the attention of federal employees across 
government agencies. S/CRS has hired individuals for both the Active and Standby 
Components of the CRC which now number 113 and 500, respectively.49 S/CRS has sent 
members of its office and members of the Active Component to Afghanistan, Haiti, the 
Eastern Congo and Sri Lanka to lead small assessment teams to determine what S/CRS, 
and more broadly what U.S. government resources can bring to the improve the 
situation. Members of the Standby Component have also been deployed; in one case 
a foreign affairs officer in the State Department was deployed for 90 days to 
Afghanistan with the objective of enhancing civil military cooperation at the brigade 
level. While these events indicate a degree of deployability with regard to U.S. S&R 
capabilities, the CRC is undoubtedly still in its early days of development.  
 
                                                 
46 Interview with U.S. official, USEU, op.cit. 
47 John Herbst, Coordinator S/CRS, “Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations: Learning from 
the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Experience”, Statement before House Armed Services 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 3 October 2007, p. 4. 
48 Interview with U.S. official, USEU, op.cit. 
49 “Report to Congress on Implementation of Title XVI of P.L. 110-417,  the Reconstruction and 
Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008”, U.S. Department of State, Office of the 
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, retrieved 10 June 2009, 
http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm? fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=CDFI.  
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3.3 Convergence or Divergence? EU-U.S. Conceptions and Approaches 
 
A striking resemblance between EU and U.S. perceptions of CCM and S&R appears 
throughout an examination of each actor’s developments in the field. Though vastly 
different narratives – the EU one of creating policies and institutions and the U.S. one of 
adapting existing agencies and policies – the need for civilian capacities has gathered 
similar support and momentum in both the EU and U.S. The experiences of each actor 
also demonstrates that acquiring the necessary tools to confront instability in conflict 
situations today is still a relatively new challenge to which each continues to takes steps 
to confront. This theme can be seen in the coinciding shifts that occurred in the EU and 
U.S. somewhat recently. The ‘breakthrough’ in the EU with the 2004 Action Plan and the 
2004 creation of S/CRS within the State Department both refocused the attention of 
policies to better address crisis management.  
A similar recognition and appreciation for the complexities present in stabilization 
and reconstruction undertakings offers perhaps the greatest area of convergence. The 
EU may have framed such tasks in the form of CCM priority areas or operational labels 
(police missions, boarder assistance missions, etc.), while the U.S. has sought to harness 
existing civilian resources across government agencies, but nonetheless their 
conceptions embrace a wide understanding of the tools necessary for the job. The idea 
of an ‘integrated’ response lay at the core of EU and U.S. policy. Their operational goals 
both consist of developing the capacity to shoulder a mission that can address the 
variety of needs which societies emerging from conflicts will bring forward. S/CRS plans 
for a three tiered civilian response corps greatly resemble the Union’s CRTs and overall 
modular/package approach. One EU official even suggests that there was a “certain 
amount of inspiration” taken from the EU in developing the parameters of the U.S. 
CRC.50 In addition, the policing and rule of law activities which have taken priority in EU 
CCM are also present in a central way in U.S. plans for the CRC. 
In addition, both have acknowledged that their efforts face a “spectrum of 
conflict”,51 necessitating responses ranging from military intervention to unarmed civilian 
monitoring. In its ‘comprehensive approach’ the EU seeks to integrate both military and 
civilian responses catered to the intensity of the conflict. Likewise NSPD-44 plans for 
scenarios in which the civilian resources will be deployed both independently and in 
“harmonization with planned or ongoing U.S. military operations”.52 The rhetoric of each 
actor, however, lacks backing by substantial operational experience in applying this 
                                                 
50 Interview with EU official, Directorate of Civilian Crisis Management, Directorate General E-9, 
Council of the European Union, Brussels, 30 April 2008.   
51 The White House, National Security Presidential Directive 44, op.cit. 
52 Ibid.  
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civ-mil approach. Successful integration of both military and civilian ESDP capacities on 
the ground still confronts EU policymakers as one of the biggest shortfalls in their 
professed expertise in the field. For Washington, the introduction of a strong civilian 
agency presence alongside troops in the field will likely face the challenge of carving a 
role for itself among those S&R tasks traditionally dominated by the military and take 
time to evolve into practice.53 Both actors also face parallel obstacles to their rapid 
response aspirations and in securing their aspired number of personnel. While the EU 
struggles to obtain necessary resources from Member States, U.S. officials have turned 
from former habits of recruiting through pricey private contractors to now struggling to 
coordinate and train to capacity U.S. government employees.  
In sum, as one U.S. official suggests, U.S. endeavors in S&R have “the same 
intellectual approach as the EU”.54 Upon deeper comparison remarkable similarities in 
EU CCM and U.S. S&R may prompt observers to suggest that the ‘comprehensive 
approach’ which lay at the heart of the EU’s policy in CCM and the ‘whole of 
government’ approach which forms the foundation of U.S. policy in this field are nearly 
equals. Though basic institutional differences between the EU and U.S. naturally affect 
the way in which this policy is pursued and the challenges this policy will face, the 
common intellectual underpinning, I argue, exists.  
 
4. The Emergence of Cooperation: Time Is Ripe 
 
While the U.S. and EU appear on the same page in their strides to develop policy in 
CCM and S&R, practical cooperation in the area has faced the realities of the deep-set 
paradigm of NATO primacy which has long governed the transatlantic security 
relationship. Since ESDP’s beginnings U.S. policy toward the Union’s endeavors have 
been one of hesitancy to engage and endorse ESDP and insistency that NATO remain 
the forefront actor in transatlantic security. The gradual emergence of a bilateral 
relationship has appeared only recently and discretely. 
The long-running debate triggered in Washington by the creation of the ESDP, as 
one author notes, has cooled to the credit of the rising significance of integrated, 
civilian post-conflict capacities and American recognition of growing EU expertise in the 
field.55 The mounting transformation underway in the U.S. offers the greatest impetus for 
cooperation. Growing in popularity, ‘smart power’ has become the buzz word in 
                                                 
53 N. Bensahel et al. , Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, RAND 
National Defense Research Institute, Santa Monica, 2009, p. 7.   
54 Interview with U.S. official, USEU, op.cit. 
55 E. Brimmer, Seeing Blue: American Visions of the European Union, Chaillot Paper, no. 105, Paris, 
EU Institute for Security Studies, 2007, p. 19.  
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Washington, and S/CRS stands as the most practical incarnation of these efforts. The 
creation of an office charged with the task of harnessing the civilian capacities of the 
U.S. government made, for the first time, cooperation with international partners in this 
field possible. Mandated specifically to ‘leverage international resources’ and pursue 
coordination with foreign partners, a clear path was paved for S/CRS to knock at the 
door of the EU.56 Indeed, in 2005 the first S/CRS head Carlos Pascual, who an EU official 
recalled as “very vocal” and “very interested”, set out on this path, approaching his EU 
counterparts.57   
The time proved ripe, however, for reasons on both sides of the Atlantic. While 
the U.S. became positioned, both institutionally and philosophically, to cooperate, the 
EU also became poised for courtship by the U.S. Launching its first ESDP mission in only 
2003, the Union had yet to solidify its legitimacy as an actor in international security and 
defense. As one U.S. official notes, the Administration viewed ESDP deployment, in its 
early days, as merely a testing mechanism for European integration.58 With a mission or 
two under its belt, the EU was simply “checking a box”.59 As ESDP activities extended in 
size and scope, and ventured to situations which saw EU personnel in conditions 
involving actual risk, Washington regarded ESDP endeavors with greater seriousness. 
“Curious,” as one EU official suggests, and recognizing the competence the EU had 
acquired in CCM, U.S. officials, and certainly S/CRS, felt there were lessons to be learned 
from their partners across the Atlantic.60 
 
4.1 Comprehensive Approach 
 
However, attempts by EU and U.S. officials to include a pledge to pursue cooperation in 
the area of crisis management within the 2005 EU-U.S. Summit statement were a “flop”.61 
A t  t h e  c o r e  o f  w h a t  w o u l d  b e c o m e  a  n e a r l y  t h r e e - y e a r  e f f o r t  b y  p o l i c y m a k e r s  t o  
formalize a partnership lay the two words ‘comprehensive approach’. EU officials 
insisted on the inclusion of this phrase, the concept which lay at the heart of ESDP. Not 
simply a ‘civilian power’, the Union views civil-military synergies as inseparable and 
foundational to successful engagement in failed states. Though purporting an 
integrated, ‘whole of government’ approach themselves, dabbing into the realm of 
                                                 
56 Interview with EU official, Directorate Transatlantic Relations, Directorate General E, Council 
Secretariat, Brussels, 27 March 2008. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Interview with U.S. official, USEU, op.cit.  
59 The interviewee added, “some police missions were smaller than even the U.S. Army Band”. 
Ibid. 
60 Interview with EU official, DGE-9, op.cit.  
61 Ibid.  
  19 Alice Serar 
bilateral military cooperation with the EU triggered a read light for U.S. officials. 
Meanwhile, EU officials were staunchly resisting being placed “in a civilian box.”62 
Though grateful for the possibility of cooperation, EU policymakers would not 
compromise the foundational concepts of ESDP. In 2005, “we couldn’t get around the 
civ-mil knot” as one individual describes.63 Jeopardizing NATO primacy played nowhere 
in the cards as U.S. interagency officials made clear by putting a hold on 2005 efforts.  
Thereafter “ideas filtered slowly,” according to one individual involved, and in the 
2006 summit statement reference was included to “positive and mutually beneficial 
dialogue” in ‘crisis management’.64 Regular consultation was established between EU 
representatives and S/CRS. Cooperation began to manifest itself in subtle ways, with EU 
participation in two Multinational Exercises conducted by the U.S. and NATO in addition 
to other countries.65   
The 2007 summit statement heralded a breakthrough in efforts. In what many 
interviewees expressed as an arduous ongoing debate, the concluding paragraph of 
the joint statement awarded policymakers the fruits of their endurance: recognition that 
“modern crisis management requires a comprehensive approach”.66 Though quickly 
followed by a reiteration of commitment to NATO, officials obtained their mandate to 
move forward on a work plan. Softened to acceptability with a careful balance of 
‘civilian’ references and commitment to enhancing multilateral efforts through NATO, 
the UN and other forums, the Work Plan was released in December 2007. “The actors still 
hold their understanding of [comprehensive approach]”, as one official suggests, but 
most agree the intellectual approaches of the Union and those that are embodied by 
S/CRS are in reality quite comparable.67 Another notes “the fact that we could come to 
this agreement reflects that our perspectives are growing ever-closer together”.68   
 
                                                 
62 Ibid.  
63 Ibid. 
64 The White House, “2006 U.S.-EU Summit Progress Report on Political and Security Issues”, 21 June 
2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060621-4.html.  
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67 Interview with EU official, DGE-9, op.cit. 
68 Interview with a U.S. official, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR/ERA), U.S. 
Department of State, 2 May 2008. 
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4.2 The Work Plan: Thematic and Continual Cooperation 
 
Centered on “thematic and continual cooperation”, the provisions prescribed in the 
Work Plan – in its full title “EU-U.S. Technical Dialogue and Increased Cooperation in Crisis 
Management and Conflict Prevention” – are described by one official as “not very 
sexy”.69 While cooperation may in the future manifest itself in country- or conflict-specific 
collaboration, the Work Plan’s primary aim is to create a relationship through which 
European and American policymakers can together develop and better their 
approaches to meeting the security challenges emanating from crises. Several main 
areas for cooperation, areas in which joint efforts have already began, demonstrate the 
nature of the work EU and U.S. officials have set out to do. 
 
Security Agreement and Exchange of Watch-Lists 
The most notable feat accomplished by policymakers thus far has been the exchange 
of country watch lists: each actor’s internal report of countries which pose the greatest 
risks of instability. A security agreement signed early 2008 allowed for the exchange of 
classified documents, a crucial step, and significant advancement, in the relationship. 
The swap facilitates cooperation through both discussion of each actor’s methods for 
determining the list, which one official suggests vary greatly, and collaboration on 
where and how policymakers might add value in addressing a conflict situation. 
Selecting a handful of countries/conflicts EU and U.S. policymakers can consider a 
range of options – political engagement, development assistance, a civilian mission, 
etc. – and strive to coordinate the response deemed most suitable.70 
 
Best Practices, Lessons Learned, Training 
As emphasized by several interviewees, the logistics behind recruiting for, coordinating 
and conducting civilian conflict response activities poses many difficulties for actors, far 
more complex than the military. In the rather entrepreneurial realm of dealing with 
civilian aspects of conflict management, the EU and U.S. continue to develop and 
refine their approaches and operational concepts. Dialogue on best practices and 
lessons learned will aim to augment the capacity of both parties to work effectively in 
the field. Recognizing EU expertise in the field, especially in police missions, U.S. 
policymakers are particularly interested in this facet of cooperation. Asking questions, 
exchanging ideas, planning exercises – these activities embody the larger aim of the 
Work Plan as the floor map for a forum in which the EU and U.S., acknowledging that 
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much remains to be explored in the field, can discover new methods and ideas 
together. 
 
Multilateral Cooperation 
“We are definitely not at the center of it all”, one official pointed out, “it’s fast-changing; 
everyone is setting the standards”.71 Empowering the UN, the OSCE, the G-8, certainly 
NATO and other international actors, policymakers have viewed this bilateral 
partnership in the bigger picture, recognizing the global effort in forming capacities for 
conflict prevention and crisis management. Particular emphasis is placed upon support 
for the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Both EU and U.S. officials noted the importance 
of multilateral initiatives, expressing interest in “seeing what we can do to reinforce these 
efforts.”72   
Policymakers involved in the Work Plan foresee a busy agenda for their work 
together, and one such opportunity has already presented itself as a forum for 
collaboration. Looking to U.S. participation in EULEX Kosovo as a test case will provide 
insight into potential obstacles the bilateral security relationship may face as 
cooperation, both on the ground and as called for in the Work Plan, comes under way.  
 
5. The Kosovo Test Case: Looking to the Future 
 
The U.S. contribution to the ESDP Mission in Kosovo, formally launched in 
December 2008, runs on a separate storyline as the Work Plan, but I argue there is a 
crucial connection between the two. Though cooperation in Kosovo “is not held 
hostage by the Work Plan,” as one official made a point to mention, the scenario can 
serve as a suitable sample case from which to anticipate where problems may arise in a 
more regular, continual relationship in the field of CCM as planned for the future.73 
Playing the role of a third-party contributor in an ESDP operation certainly is not the 
primary objective of U.S. engagement with the Union in CCM cooperation. Joint 
development of concepts and best practices alongside joint assessment of 
international conflicts will provide a platform from which combined efforts in the field will 
only later begin. The current EU-U.S. relationship remains in only the first stages of 
cooperation, while the Kosovo partnership is as one U.S. official describes, a “one off”.74   
The novelty of this development, however, deserves its due praise. The first 
instance of U.S. participation in an ESDP operation, the event speaks bounds to the 
                                                 
71 Interview with EU official, DGE Transatlantic Relations, op.cit. 
72 Interview with U.S. official, EUR/ERA, op.cit. 
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genuine cooling in U.S. perceptions of EU endeavors in the area of security and defense. 
Kosovo has long been the sight for a web of various international projects and activities. 
As the EU heads international efforts to maintain stability while Kosovar authorities 
transition their society to independence, the U.S. contribution of roughly 80 police 
officers and eight rule of law experts to EULEX Kosovo signals U.S. recognition of the 
Union’s civilian operational capacity.75 Though the implications of this unprecedented 
development prove positive for transatlantic security relations, working through the 
details and repercussions of such an arrangement may surface complications in this 
new area of cooperation.  
 
Institutional Complications 
Still in its infancy, S/CRS has only begun to take reign of interagency cooperation in the 
area of S&R, and thus the range of assets envisioned for various non-military operations 
span a handful of U.S. departments, from the Justice Department to USAID, and even 
other bureaus within the State Department. In EULEX Kosovo, for example, S/CRS will not 
“hold the line” on U.S. participation.76 The creation of S/CRS in 2004 does not affect the 
functioning of any existing bureaus within the U.S. government, and as the CRC 
continues to develop, police recruitment for international civilian activities continues to 
fall to the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement within the State 
Department, and thus responsibility for the contribution to EULEX Kosovo has fallen 
accordingly. EU officials involved in cooperation with the U.S. on CCM have pointed out 
that S/CRS “is not an exclusive partner” but that the Work Plan allows for cooperation 
across U.S. government agencies.77 As the U.S. works to formalize and implement a 
‘whole of government’ approach at home, confusion seems to linger among U.S. 
officials concerning the role and place of S/CRS in the development and operation of 
this approach.78 The efforts of the U.S. government at home and cooperation with the 
Union may be impeded if EU policy makers bypass S/CRS and freely roam the directories 
of multiple U.S. government agencies.  
At the same time the EU’s multinational nature may burden its ability to be a 
viable partner in this policy area. In the case of EULEX Kosovo, deployment faced 
months of delay at the hand of Serbian concerns that the mission would not protect the 
                                                 
75  Interview with U.S. official, Political Section, U.S. Mission to NATO, Brussels, 22 June 2009. The U.S. 
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rights of Kosovo Serbs.79 Originally agreed in December 2007, the rule of law mission did 
not deploy until December 2008 and only then began its work on the condition of 
neutrality to Kosovo’s status. However, as EU officials adhered closely to the pledge of 
EULEX neutrality in press statements and interviews, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
State Daniel Fried announced without hesitation in an OSCE Ministerial Council meeting 
that the EULEX mission is “not status-neutral at all” but would “greatly strengthen 
Kosovo’s territorial integrity”.80 While the EU must tread carefully, and sometimes at the 
detriment or delay of crisis management operations, on sensitive issues where Member 
States’ national positions vary greatly,81 the U.S., by simple virtue of being a federal 
entity, can and will often act more boldly and with stronger policy positions and 
mandates. Likewise, U.S. stabilization and reconstruction capabilities, though still in the 
early stages of development, will be resourced from a single federal government and 
do not rely on national contributions, with personnel varying in degrees of training, as 
must the EU. If lengthy delays, weak mandates or inefficiencies in personnel numbers or 
competence become recurring themes in the EU’s CCM endeavors the U.S. may well 
bypass cooperation with the Union and opt to act alone or though a coalition of the 
willing.  
 
Pushing its Way In? U.S. Influence and Control 
As a third-party contributor in EULEX Kosovo, the U.S. has acquired a seat on the Union’s 
Committee of Contributors which periodically meets to obtain updates and discuss the 
operation. As Turkey has long complained, however, the Committee members hold no 
control over the political decisions taken on the mission. As one U.S. official put bluntly, 
“the U.S. won’t sit still on this; we insist on having a meaningful voice in strategic 
decisions”.82 Holding a hard line on augmenting their say as a contributor, U.S. officials 
suggested the U.S. would push for a ‘mechanism’ to have its views taken into account. 
The curiosity and open-mindedness of American officials, in particular those in S/CRS, in 
seeking out cooperation in an area the Union has considerable expertise will face 
reconciliation with Washington’s desire to remain informed and in control of U.S. 
involvement abroad. A fear may develop on the part of EU policymakers that 
cooperation in CCM may become a facet through which Washington can “check in” 
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80 Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State, “Press Conference of Assistant Secretary of State 
Daniel Fried, OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting, Helsinki, Finland,” 5 December 2008, retrieved 10 
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81 Several EU Member States have not recognized Kosovo’s independence.  
82 Interview with U.S. official, USEU, 7 April 2008, op.cit. 
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on “what the Union is up to”.83 If U.S. officials manage to obtain a higher position of 
influence than typical for third parties, Member States or other third-party contributors 
may complain that the U.S. has received special treatment.  
 
Back to NATO 
The EULEX Kosovo case also sheds light on the broader issue at play in the transatlantic 
security relationship: NATO dominance. As plans for the U.S. contribution were 
announced and began to formalize, U.S. policymakers took great care to reinforce the 
message that the contribution would be a ‘one-off’. One U.S. official recalls having to 
calm NATO partners with the assurance that the operation was civilian only.84  
As the operation has gotten underway, U.S. policymakers seem pleased with the 
state of cooperation at the institutional level and on the ground, so much so that one 
official suggests they have eased from the strict ‘one-off’ policy line regarding the U.S. 
contribution. At the signing of the official agreement on the participation of the U.S. in 
EULEX Kosovo in October 2008, Assistant Secretary Fried went so far as to suggest the 
U.S. contribution “establishes a precedent” for what he hopes “is a future cooperation 
between the U.S. and EU”.85 U.S. officials admit that there are “practical and 
pragmatic”86 cases where contribution to an EU mission, particularly in the present 
future as the U.S. finds itself overstretched in other parts of the world, could prove the 
optimal option for the U.S.87 One U.S. official even admits some U.S. policymakers could 
see the logic in, on a limited, cautious basis and in a very practical sense, military-to-
military cooperation with the EU.88 The timing of positive results in cooperation with EULEX 
Kosovo around the same time as the EU took the lead in counter-piracy efforts off the 
coast of Somalia may certainly have the new U.S. Administration pondering its scope 
and manner of cooperation with the EU in the realm of security. 
                                                
At the same time, however, those same policymakers are mindful of the effects 
of such actions on NATO. An influx of U.S. direct cooperation with the EU in civilian, and 
especially military, ESDP operations could pose an existential threat to the Alliance. With 
each instance of bilateral cooperation the U.S. fears “training the EU to bypass NATO” 
and come knocking directly at Washington’s door for material and personnel resources 
 
83 Ibid.  
84 Ibid.  
85 Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State, “Assistant Secretary Fried Welcomes U.S. Participation 
in EULEX Kosovo Mission”, U.S. Mission to the EU, retrieved 20 July 2009, http://useu.usmission.gov/ 
Dossiers/Balkans/Oct2208_Fried_EULEX_Statement.asp 
86 Interview with U.S. official, USEU, 20 July 2009, op.cit.  
87 Interview with U.S. official, USNATO, op.cit.  
88 Ibid.  
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for ESDP missions.89 Bilateral cooperation also does not serve to better the state of NATO-
EU cooperation, a partnership that officials on both sides of the Atlantic readily admit is 
flawed. Despite a significant warming of U.S. government attitudes toward ESDP the 
central fact remains: the U.S. is a member of NATO; it is not a member of the EU. Without 
a seat at the table, the U.S. simply lacks a significant degree of involvement in an 
operation, particularly in the planning process. As ESDP and NATO adapt and address 
future global crises, U.S. officials must weigh the benefits and drawbacks of bilateral 
cooperation with the EU and carefully develop a balanced way ahead. Likewise EU 
officials will have to consider exercising sensitivity to U.S. concerns and restraining 
themselves from too outwardly circumventing NATO, or the task of improving the NATO-
EU relationship, and knocking directly at Washington’s door.  
 
6. Conclusion: Tackling Today’s  Complex Crises Together 
 
This paper has investigated a twofold question. The first part of that question asked 
whether the EU and U.S. conceive and approach non-military conflict response in similar 
ways. I have argued that Americans and Europeans continue to cope with the reality 
that the burden of Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent now, Iraq has not yet been lifted 
from their shoulders. The challenges of stabilization and reconstruction continue to send 
policymakers grappling for answers and resources. As I have shown, both Washington 
and Brussels are looking in the same direction for remedies to their questions. Regardless 
of the name they prefer, be it ‘whole of government’ or ‘comprehensive approach’, 
the complex crises of today demand an integrated, holistic response, one which calls 
on the collective action of a range of civilian assets and the capacity to manage 
operations across the spectrum of conflict. Faced with tasks that require extensive 
planning, capable personnel and long-term political will, EU and U.S. officials have 
heard and heeded the call for collective action. 
The second part of the question explored in this piece inquired why cooperation 
in CCM has come so cautiously and how it may develop in the future. I have argued 
that the years of efforts prior to the release of the Work Plan have signaled that EU-U.S. 
cooperation in CCM has intruded into a policy area formerly off-limits to bilateral action 
and reserved by NATO. The eventual success of those years of efforts has signaled that 
this partnership has accessed a new path for security relations and even contributed to 
a broader paradigm shift in the transatlantic security community. Looking to the case of 
U.S. participation in EULEX Kosovo, however, indicates that traditional NATO dominance 
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over transatlantic security relations will likely linger as an obstacle to bilateral 
cooperation alongside other challenges such as institutional complications.  
Nonetheless, the enthusiasm I gathered from both EU and U.S. interviewees 
suggests that a bigger prize lay in the initiatives begun by the Work Plan. As one EU 
official predicts, the efforts in CCM could well be a ‘gateway’ to deeper security ties 
and the key to a transformed EU-NATO-U.S. joint venture in confronting international 
security issues.90 The optimal arrangement envisioned by one U.S. official would come 
when the EU, NATO and the U.S. could “sit around a table and ask: which organization is 
best suited to respond to this issue? What is needed and who will provide those 
elements?”91 Cooperation in CCM has taken the first step toward this “seamless 
relationship”.92 
  The election of President Obama and certainly his trips to Europe thus far have, 
as one journalist phrases it, “removed the bad taste of the last eight years”.93 At the 
same, at the annual Munich security conference where former Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld had made his famous ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe speech, Vice President 
Joe Biden this year stated U.S. support for “the further strengthening of European 
defense, an increased role for the European Union in preserving peace and security”.94 
The mending of transatlantic ties and the warming of U.S. policy towards ESDP are 
trends that appear will continue in the months and years to come. With work initiated 
under the Work Plan and positive results from the first U.S. contribution to an ESDP 
mission, the EU and U.S. are well on their way to finding themselves side by side in 
confronting today’s complex crises.  
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92 Ibid.  
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